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IN DEFENSE OF DETERRENCE
Andrew F. Popper*
The civil justice system deters misconduct. It generates farreaching and positive market effects beyond victim compensation
and recovery.
Civil judgments, settlements, the potential for
litigation-the tort system itself-has a beneficial effect on the
behavior of those who are the subject of legal action as well as
others in the same or similar lines of commerce. Over the last
twenty years, legal scholars have debated whether the civil justice
system generally, and tort recovery in particular, generates a
deterrent effect. Those who have argued for tort reform (limiting
the expanse and reach of accountability in the civil justice system)
contend that the tort system has failed to live up to its promise of
providing meaningful deterrence. Those who oppose tort reform
and defend the civil justice system argue that tort cases have a
powerful effect not only on the parties, but also on others involved
in similar activity. This article takes the following position: those
supporting tort reform cannot wish away deterrence. To claim that
punishment has no effect on other market participants is to deny
our collective experience. Deterrence is a real and present virtue of
the tort system. The actual or potential imposition of civil tort
liability changes the behavior of others.
I. INTRODUCTION
For families suffering the wrongful death of a loved one and
victims of defective products or negligent acts-suffering brain
injury, loss of a limb, the ability to reason, or the capacity to love
and be loved-litigation is about more than money.1 It is about
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Daniel Hernandez, Suit Alleges Hazing in Death, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002,
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/24/local/me-high24 ('This is a very courageous family.
They don't want their daughter to die in vain."'); see School's Negligence Is Held Responsible
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more than vengeance or retribution. It is about the promise of the
civil justice system.
Civil justice for plaintiffs derives from the fairness of the process,
the right to have one's story told, meaningful remedy, and one
additional factor: plaintiffs ask the legal system to take steps to
prevent repetition of their tragedy. 2 Prevention of future harm is a
powerful public expectation and basic motivation for those injured
3
by wrongful acts or defective products.
Families and victims do not want their tragedy to be a loss in
vain, a hope expressed by some courts as well. 4 Individuals and
entities brought to justice establish models for future actions
producing positive incentives that lessen the probability that others
will suffer the same harm they experienced. 5 When school athletic
In Death of Climber, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1990 (regarding a $500,000 judgment: "'I'm happy to
have justice done .... [Mly son did not die in vain.... It isn't the money."').
2 Robyn Claridy, Family Files Lawsuit in Gregg County Jail Death, LONGVIEW NEWS-J.
(Tex.), June 9, 2011, http://www.news-journal.com/news/local/article-fOadece3-b8c7-5b2a9d3b-556a9cla753d.html ("Gregg County is required to provide reasonable medical care to
inmates .... '[T]he only way any effective change was going to be made [was a lawsuit] ....
[T]here was no other way to get justice for Amy, or any of the other inmates that are
suffering."'); see Matt Kakley, Lawsuit Filed in Explosion, SUN CHRON. (Mass.), Jan. 5, 2011,
http://www.thesunchronicle.com/articles/2011/01/05/news/8640123.txt (The decedent's brother
commented: '"[w]e hope that Billy did not die in vain .... We do not want any other families
to suffer [a] nightmarish experience ... like this."').
3 See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort

Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1992) (stating that
"compensating innocent victims for injury and deterring behavior that presents risks that
exceed their social value" are among the most prominent social purposes of tort law).
4 Urseth v. City of Dayton, 680 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (rejecting the
defenses raised in a wrongful death case against the City of Dayton). There, the court held
that "[t]o do otherwise will be to risk another James Urseth case, another tragedy which will,
while proclaiming loud and clear that the community has learned nothing from the death of
James Urseth, serve as proof positive that he died needlessly and in vain." Id. Wheat v.
United States, 630 F. Supp. 699, 721 (W.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 860 F.2d
1256 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Should the United States fail to correct the procedures that negligently
caused the untimely death of Shilla Wheat ... then Shilla Wheat suffered and died in vain.");
Care and Protection of Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d 918, 930 (Mass. 2006) ("If Sharlene's case helps
other children to escape their misery, her short life will not have been in vain.").
5 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009) (finding that one form of Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") approval was not preemptive, the Court held: "In keeping with
Congress' decision not to pre-empt common-law tort suits, it appears that the FDA
traditionally regarded state law as a complementary form of drug regulation."); Bravman v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("It must be recognized that
state tort actions, although clearly imperfect, remain a powerful incentive for improving
product safety."); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Mature Product Preemption Doctrine: The
Unitary Standard and the Paradoxof Consumer Protection, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 95, 114
(2009) ("Tort litigation provides an incentive to manufacturers to conduct substantial safety
follow-ups on their products on the market."); Mary J. Davis, The Case Against Preemption:
Vaccines & Uncertainty, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 291, 314 (2011) (stating that the "tort
litigation system provides the incentive for drug manufacturers" to secure better
information); Philip G. Peters, Jr., ResuscitatingHospital EnterpriseLiability, 73 MO. L. REV.
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programs fail to protect a student 6 or an infant's breathing monitor
fails, 7 i.e., when avoidable disaster strikes, we look to the legal
system for recognition of harm-and for the hope that future losses
can be avoided.
In a contractarian model of the legal system, a party who harmed
another would simply pay for it.8 The tort system is not primarily
contractarian. 9 It is about fault and responsibility, obligation and
foresight, carried out with the hope that civil justice produces a
result that acknowledges plaintiffs losses and limits the possibility
of a repetition of plaintiffs tragedy. It is about deterrence.
The nature of a legal proceeding or judgment affects the deterrent
impact of that action. The civil justice system reflects a remarkably
complex array of procedures, judgments, and other legal actions. A
punitive damage award is likely to have a more immediate
deterrent effect than a simple negligence case with modest
compensatory damages. 10 Cases that result in an articulation of
clear norms or principles will have more of a deterrent effect than
those that do not.11
Each case in a common law system creates the potential for
normative articulation and deterrent impact. The force of a clear
judicial determination of liability is undeniable. Similarly situated
entities assess such findings and either reconfigure their action or
369, 369-70 (2008) ("Adoption of enterprise liability would align the incentives of tort law
with the goals of modern patient safety advocates .... ").
6 Mark Konkol, Ex-prep Football Player Sues Over 1999 Hazing; Ex-teammates, Coach
Named, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 30, 2009, at 14. A high school football player filed a lawsuit
after being sodomized by his teammates with a broomstick and a banana as part of a violent
hazing ritual. Id. "[Mlore than money ... the goal of the lawsuit is to make sure 'this will
not happen again...."' Id.
7 Neil Steinberg, Hospital Added to Suit in Baby's Death, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at
14 ("Christ Hospital and Medical Center announced... it is 'making every conceivable effort
to make certain an infant electrocution will not happen again,' as the hospital was added to a
lawsuit filed by the parents of a newborn who died there last month.").
8 See generally Roy Kreitner, Fault at the Contract-Tort Interface, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1533
(2009) (describing the basic contours of a tort law system based on a contractarian model).
9 See generally id. (arguing that although somewhat oversimplified, contract deals with
enforcement of agreement between private actors while tort produced both remedy and de
facto regulation); Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Foreword: Fault in American Contract
Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (2009) (exploring and critiquing the tort/contract
distinction).
10 See, e.g., Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental
Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 464 (2004); James Andreoni et al., The Carrot or the Stick:
Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation,93 AM. ECON. REV. 893, 894 (2003).
11 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 50 (1983) ("[M]ost officials are guided primarily by the
underlying standards of federal substantive law-both out of devotion to duty, and in the
interest of avoiding liability for compensatory damages ....
[T]he conscientious officer who
desires clear guidance on how to do his job and avoid lawsuits can and should look to the
standard for actionability in the first instance.").

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 75.1

behavior (a deterrent response) or choose not to do so and, thereby,
risk downstream liability.1 2 Frankly, it is hard to conceive of a
healthy economic model where rational actors ignore clear warning
signs and thus render themselves vulnerable to sanctions or
punishment. 13 Recognizing that different types of cases and
outcomes are likely to produce varied responses by nonparties is by
14
no means an indication of the lack of deterrent effect.
It is a fair guess that the pointed and at times bellicose nature of
the tort reform debate has made it more dangerous to speak
realistically about deterrence. 15 Perhaps those supporting tort
reform's gross limitation of accountability are concerned that
acknowledging a powerful deterrent effect in a particular case
would undercut the baseline assumptions of tort reform. Similarly,
for consumer advocates and those who litigate on behalf of plaintiffs
and oppose tort reform, acknowledgement that certain cases have
little or no deterrent effect could be seen as undercutting their antitort reform position. 16 Thus, it should come as no surprise that
there is no single comprehensive juried study that looks broadly at
12 See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1604 (2002) (describing the argument
that "tort law deters unsafe behavior in a comprehensive and systematic way" used by prodeterrence torts theorists).
13 Governmental entities may be less affected by tort judgments than private sector
entities. See Paul Figley, In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion, 60 AM. U. L.
REV. 393, 462 (2010) ("[T]here is reason to believe that governments are not responsive to
financial deterrence in the same way as private entities."); Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization
and Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share the Sovereign's Immunities from
Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 213 (1997) ("The dual purposes of imposing such
damages-punishment and deterrence-do not as readily apply to the government qua
government as they do to a private actor.").
14 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 425-27 (1994) (arguing that while deterrent effect varies based
on the area of tort law and other factors, the notion that deterrence is a "real" and intended
consequence of the civil justice system is valid); see STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 292 (1987).
15 See, e.g., John A. Albers, State of Confusion: Substantive and Procedural Due Process
with Regard to Punitive Damages after TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 26
U. TOL. L. REV. 159, 203 (1994) (characterizing tort reform as a "bitter turf war between
plaintiffs' attorneys and corporate America"); Michael King, Fiddling While Texas Burns,
AUSTIN CHRON., Mar. 28, 2003, http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2003-03-28/151857/
(reporting that tort reform debates in Texas legislature consisted of "increasingly angry
exchanges" and were "long and bitter"); Stuart Taylor, Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 42, 46-48; Neil Vidmar & Leigh Anne Brown, Tort Reform and
the Medical Liability Insurance Crisis in Mississippi:Diagnosing the Disease and Prescribing
a Remedy, 22 MISS. C. L. REV. 9, 34-35 (2002).
16 See generally Stephen J. Shapiro, Overcoming Under-Compensation and UnderDeterrence in Intentional Tort Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages the Best Remedy?, 62
MERCER L. REV. 449, 450-59 (2011) (noting a variety of claims and arguments on both sides
of the deterrence debate and citing to jurisprudence bolstering both sides of the discussion).
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the deterrent effect of tort law. 17 Instead, the literature consists of
well-researched position papers, testimony, opinions, and scholarly
articles of academicians of every stripe as well as those of
practitioners, economists, and others.1 8
This article references a number of those works on deterrence and
tort law and concludes that the tort system is fully defensible as a
primary deterrent mechanism. It is not a perfect system. Not every
case deters. In the aggregate, however, the civil justice system
provides a powerful and continuous messaging device that
positively affects the safety and efficiency of goods and services.

II.

NORMATIVE FUNCTION AND MARKET MESSAGING: THE CORE OF
DETERRENCE

The debate regarding deterrence can be distilled down to
messaging. A tort case can communicate a normative message, an
avoidance message, or a message affirming current practices. 19 To
deny that judicial decisions provide a valuable deterrent effect is to
deny the historic role of the judiciary, not just as a matter of civil
justice but as a primary and fundamental source of behavioral
norms. 20 Part of the task of the judiciary is to be a solid and
objective voice of reason and reasonability, articulating standards
that are just, even when they go against the grain in a business or
an entire industry. 21 "Courts must in the end say what is required;
there are precautions so imperative that even their universal

17 See Mello & Brennan, supra note 12, at 1604 (stating that "empirical evidence of
deterrence is indeed difficult to come by").
18 See generally JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 511-19 (9th ed. 1994) (referencing several examples of considerations
and questions taken into account by judges, academicians, legislator, and other important
"players" in the debate over the deterrent effect of tort law).
19 University of Oxford Law Professor P.S. Atiyah, who is generally grouped with pro tort
reform scholars, noted that: "American tort law [can be seen] as the major means for setting
norms and standards ....[T]ort law is a response to the demands of a society in which there
are many grievances not regarded as the responsibility of governments to redress." P.S.
Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J.
1002, 1018 (1987).
20 See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Garrett Cnty. v. Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc., 695 A.2d 171,
174 (Md. 1997). In this case, when county contractors severed Bell's underground cable, Bell
sued for damages. Id. The Court found for Bell and used the case to caution others involved
in excavation to exercise caution. Id. at 183-84 ("This case should serve as fair warning to
"Fair warning to anyone" is
anyone contemplating excavation." (emphasis added)).
deterrence. Id.
21 See id. at 179-81, 183 (explaining the obligations of an excavator under the utility
statute and the requirements needed to establish negligence).
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disregard will not excuse their omission." 22
It does not seem controversial to assert that the articulation of
standards or norms has a positive influence on behavior and deters
future misconduct.2 3 "[T]he threat of tort liability has the capacity
to deter broadly .. ".."24
To argue that the prospect of civil liability
has little or no effect on future behavior collides with a common
25
understanding of how we react to the potential of punishment.
"Certainly the threat of tort liability is commonly considered to have
a substantial effect on behavior."26 While there is literature
suggesting that conventional views of sanction, censure, and
punishment are in need of study, 27 there is nothing to challenge the
common sense notion that humans learn by example or that people
tailor behavior to minimize sanction.
In discussing the potential of tort liability within a family unit,
where courts have been hesitant to intervene, Professor Benjamin
Shmueli observed that "[tiort law sends the message-both to the
specific tortfeasor and to potential tortfeasors-that there are
certain values that society is not willing to compromise. Imposing
liability warns the tortfeasor that if the behavior exhibited ...is not
consistent with societal values, there will be appropriate legal
sanctions."28
Those sanctions establish both lowest common
denominator standards as well as signaling to others the most basic

22 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (citing Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels,
107 U.S. 454, 459-61 (1882); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Beyhmer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903);
Shandrew v. Chi., St. Paul, M. & 0. Ry. Co., 142 F. 320, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1905); Maynard v.
Buck, 100 Mass. 40 (1868)).
23

WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 4-

7, 58, 161-62 (1987) (explaining that tort judgments deter future misconduct).
24 Aaron Katz, A "Moving Bar" Approach to Assessing the Admissibility of Expert
CausationTestimony, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 579, 625 (2009).
25 C.B. FERSTER & B.F. SKINNER, SCHEDULES OF REINFORCEMENT 7-11 (Julie S. Vargas
ed., 1957); see generally B.F. SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM 53, 68-71 (1974) (claiming
rational beings act to avoid pain or punishment).
26 Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee
Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705, 1733 (1996) (recognizing that the motivations and
actions of individuals within a corporation create a set of behavioral variables distinct from
the overall corporate response to risk-taking behavior).
27 See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role
of Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1281, 1286-88 (2003) (challenging and testing the applicability of
game theory to punishment); see, e.g., Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the
ProceduralConception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 209-26 (2003) (studying
the philosophical underpinnings of punishment-mostly criminal-and questioning the
interrelationship with deterrence); see generally PHILIP BEAN, PUNISHMENT: A
PHILOSOPHICAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL INQUIRY (1981) (contemplating the interrelationship
between punishment, deterrence, and retribution).
28 Benjamin Shmueli, Tort Litigation Between Spouses: Let's Meet Somewhere in the
Middle, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195, 208 (2010).
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levels of acceptable and unacceptable conduct.
The norms generated in torts cases can have an impact by
defining a baseline for tolerable conduct in the workplace and
academic settings, complementing the regulatory enforcement
mechanisms extant in the field of sexual harassment. 29 While one
might argue that family members or certain workers are not fully
informed of standards that evolve in a common law context
(notwithstanding the historic presumption of knowledge of those
standards),30 private and public employers and educational
institutions are more likely aware of and responsive to the potential
for liability, 31 i.e., the deterrent effect of tort law.
Professor John C.P. Goldberg notes that beyond providing
compensation to those who are injured, "the most obvious function
tort might play is to send a message to powerful actors that they
must give due consideration to the well-being of others. Tort cases
can also foster public dialogue and debate about social problems,
32
particularly problems related to the use and abuse of power."
Abuse of power is arguably at the heart of workplace or academic
29 See Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 363 (1990) (stating that establishing a cause of action
in tort for harassment sends an unmistakable normative message).
3o The notion that the tort system informs behavior is both central to this article and not
compromised by the fact that not every person "knows the law." One assumption in this
article, however, is that most of those responsible for making critical choices in the production
of goods and services do have a working understanding of basic legal norms. The idea that
every person is presumed to know the law is aspirational. See United States v. Golitschek,
808 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1986). However, there is little question that the goal of knowledge
of legal standards or norms is founded on solid ground and that an individual claim of
ignorance is not, for the most past, a defense. See, e.g., Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 560
(Mass. 1886) ("The decisions and opinions of the justices are the authorized expositions and
interpretations of the laws, which are binding upon all the citizens. . . . Every citizen is
presumed to know the law thus declared, and it needs no argument to show that justice
requires that all should have free access to the opinions ....); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 153 (1881); Dan M.
Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127,
127-29 (1997) (exploring the theoretical premises and problems with the collective
assumption of the legal knowledge principle); Russell L. Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory
Interpretations:An Analysis of Judicial Responses, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 218 (1986)
("The notion that everyone is presumed to know the law, which is based on the maxim that
ignorance of the law is no excuse, has become a fundamental tenet of this country's legal
system." (footnote omitted)).
31 See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) ("The claim that petitioners had a ...
right to better notice . . . is without merit. All citizens are presumptively charged with
knowledge of the law .... (citation omitted)); Jones v. Local 4B, Graphic Arts Int'l Union,
595 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D.D.C. 1984) ("[W]hile Union officers are fiduciaries ... they have a
greater responsibility to obey the law. Union officers are the same as private employers, and,
are presumed to know the law."); People v. Snyder, 652 P.2d 42, 44 (Cal. 1982).
32 John C.P. Goldberg, Tort in Three Dimensions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 326 (2011)
(footnote omitted).
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harassment cases. 33
The impact or quantum force of messaging-the deterrent valueis difficult to calculate. As noted earlier, deterrent effect is driven
by the nature of the legal proceeding. It is also affected by the
notoriety of the misconduct, the resulting damages, and
commonality of the product or practice underlying the case-the
event to be deterred. On the matter of force or effect, Professor
Stephen Gilles comments: "My fundamental conclusion is that
modern American negligence law regulates activity levels to a
34
considerably greater extent than has previously been recognized."
While there is little to quantify that effect, there is simply no
credible juried study that establishes the absence of that effect. 3 5
It is perfectly consistent with overall assessments of human
37
behavior 36 "that a liability determination will affect future cases."
The proposition is simple: "[d]amage awards modify future behavior
indirectly by providing disincentives for future conduct that is
unduly risky."38 To assume otherwise is to assume some level of
widespread masochism at the individual and corporate level-and
that is nonsensical.
Civil tort judgments establish standards, tolerance levels, and
articulate valuable norms. While one might assert that effective
articulation of norms requires a clarity and certainty 39 not
uniformly present in tort cases, the capacity to articulate norms,
40
and for those norms to have a powerful force, seems clear.
33 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 90 (1979); but see Laura M. Sullivan, An Evolutionary Perspective of
Peer Sexual Harassment in American Schools: Premising Liability on Sexual, Rather Than
Power Dynamics, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 329, 329 (1997).
34 Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 319, 320 (1992).
35 See Christopher J. Bruce, The Deterrent Effects of Automobile Insurance and Tort Law:
A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 6 LAW & POLY 67, 80-84 (1984) (surveying literature on
the expense of car accidents); Schwartz, supra note 14, at 377-78 (showing there is empirical
data to suggest that tort cases have a deterrent effect); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a
Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 139, 157 (2005) (stating that
the "empirical evidence of tort law's deterrence is hazy").
36 See FERSTER & SKINNER, supra note 25, at 7-11.
37 Mary J. Davis, Toward the ProperRole for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157,
198 (1998).
35 Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the
Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 685 (2008).
39 While broad juried studies are nonexistent, there is a comprehensive study on the
question of uncertainty and deterrence finding that "uncertainty with regard to either the
size of a sanction or the probability of detection increases deterrence." Baker et al., supra
note 10, at 464.
40 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 11 ("[T]here is widespread agreement that the
imposition of tort liability on professionals ... and on business and other enterprises does
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Regarding toxic tort cases, Anthony Z. Roisman and others assessed
the potential for liability determinations to deter others from
engaging in misconduct. 4 1 They note that there are "critics [who
claim] the latency and uncertainty associated with toxic tort cases
causes companies to undervalue the potential tort claims against
them, and therefore the threat of tort liability is not likely to deter
unsafe behavior. Despite its convincing ring, this argument does
not hold up. ' 42 The authors then demonstrate that the opposite is
43
true-tort liability changes the behavior of others.
The efficiency derived from avoiding litigation and stimulating
44
behavior that is less likely to cause harm is hardly controversial.
Judge Richard Posner recognized this effect: "If. . . the benefits in
accident avoidance exceed the cost of prevention, society is better off
if those costs are incurred and the accident averted [by adopting]
45
precautions in order to avoid a greater cost in tort judgments."
While one might challenge the speed and precision of this
calculation for certain individual decisions, e.g., the choice to drive
home after having three or four drinks, it is a fundamental tenet of
basic tort law that the potential for liability influences choices made
by those in commerce responsible for the design and delivery of
46
goods and services.
There are those who have argued that even if there is a deterrent
effect, liability insurance dilutes the effect and constitutes a moral
hazard. 47 Were insurance free to the insured, premiums unaffected
affect behavior, does deter-some think too much!" (footnote omitted)); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25-26 (5th ed. 1984) (commenting on

the "prophylactic" nature of tort law).
41 See Anthony Z. Roisman et al., Preserving Justice: Defending Toxic Tort Litigation, 15
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 194 (2004).
42 Id. at 222.
43 See id.
•44See, e.g., Stephens v. Rohde, 478 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972).
45 Posner, supranote 44, at 33.
46 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) ("[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that
reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot."). See also John W. Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973) ("Experience seems
to demonstrate that if a manufacturer knows he will be held liable for injuries inflicted by his
product, that product will be safer than if he understands that he can avoid liability by
demonstrating the exercise of due care.").
47 See Seth J. Chandler, The Interaction of the Tort System and Liability Insurance
Regulation: Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 91, 93 (1996) (questioning
whether liability insurance dissipates the "deterrent force that the tort system possesses"
(footnote omitted)); see generally Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance,
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by civil judgments, and the history of American tort law to reflect
that the presence of insurance increases the likelihood of
misconduct, the argument might merit consideration. However,
none of those things are even vaguely true. Noting the absence of
abundant empirical study, William Landes and Richard Posner
draw the following conclusion: "[I]hat empirical evidence there is
indicates that tort law deters, even where . . . liability insurance is
48
widespread."
In those areas where tort judgments are modest or norms are as
yet to be developed, the lack of such decisions may be the reason
misconduct occurred. Commenting on problems in transatlantic
capital markets, Mark Brewer and others noted that 'many
members of the industry behaved ... recklessly and greater
mechanisms of deterrence could have prevented at least some of the
pain being felt now."' 49 Along similar lines, Professor Gilles noted
that were some of the recently erected barriers to tort judgments
removed, "it would send a powerful message reinforcing the
deterrent and corrective-justice goals of tort law. Individuals would
in effect be told that torts are treated as serious wrongs for which
personal responsibility is the norm, not the exception." 50
If one denies the deterrent effect of tort law, presumably one also
denies an essential purpose of the civil justice system: the
promotion of safety. While generalizations about fundamental
purpose may add little to the debate, one is hard pressed to find a
credible argument asserting that tort law does not promote public
safety. 51 In judicial opinions, the assertion can be made as a

Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and
Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 77, 88 (1993) (calling for the development of a more coherent
compensation system); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1524 (1987) (contending that the insurance crisis is a figment of expanding
modern tort liability); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability
Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 313, 336-55 (1990) ("[Tlort law's deterrence objective is
severely, perhaps fatally undermined' by the prevalence of insurance").
48 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 10.
49 Mark K. Brewer et al., Reconsidering Disclosure and Liability in the Transatlantic
Capital Markets, 9 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 257, 286 (2011) (quoting Aaron Unterman,
Innovative Destruction-StructuredFinance and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5
HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 53, 80 (2009)).
50 Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-ProofSociety, 63 WASH & LEE L. REV. 603, 679 (2006).
51 See Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106, 111 (N.J. 1996) ("The goal of deterrence ... is
especially important in the field of products-liability law."(citations omitted)); Anita Johnson,
Products Liability 'Reform" A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L. REV. 677, 692 (1978) ("The
breadth and flexibility of the common law have permitted it to effectively discipline the
harmful effects of technology."); Marc S. Moller & Paul Indig, Products Liability Law
Revisited: A Realistic Perspective, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 879, 881 (1996) ("[Plerhaps as a result
of the products liability movement of the 1960s and early 1970s, most American consumer
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contrast to contract law: "[t]ort law promotes public safety, while
warranty law protects expectations." 52 At the state court level,
"[c]ontract law protects the expectation that the parties will receive
the benefits of their bargain ... while tort law promotes safety and
protects personal and property rights by imposing a baseline duty of
care.'53
The operating assumption of courts in not just that they will be
there to provide a neutral accounting-like function to compensate an
injured party, but that they will be sending a message heard clearly
by those engaged in similar market practices. To think otherwise is
to assert that judges do not consider the broader ramifications of
54
their decisions-and that is a very unsafe assumption.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
To the extent there is a debate regarding the deterrent effect of
tort law, 55 it is difficult to see how that debate has any traction
when it comes to punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded
to punish outrageous conduct and "deter [defendants] and others...
from similar conduct in the future. '56 The dual goal of punishment
and deterrence is hardly controversial. "[P]unitive damages serve
as a warning and example to deter others ....
[They are an]
incentive to avoid tortious conduct." 57 Punitive damages are often
linked with other sanctions, for example liability under the Civil
Rights Act, where "deterrence is a primary, and common, purpose of
both [Section] 1983 liability and punitive damages .... In [some]
cases, punitive damages may be the only significant remedy.. . and
their spectre may be the only credible deterrent against

products are the safest available in the world.").
52 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Une, No. 87-C1083, 1988 WL 130050, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
23, 1988) (memorandum opinion and order).
53 Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Sam's Plumbing, LLC, 207 P.3d 765, 767 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
54 Though separation of powers concerns make clear that judges are not to "legislate from
the bench," it is fallacious to conclude that judges decide cases in isolation without
considering the ramifications of their actions. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 571, 589 (1986) (supporting the notion that judges consider the ramifications of their
decisions).
51 Compare George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 5
(1987), William H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort
Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 16-23 (1980) (claiming that individuals are not deterred by the
prospect of liability), and Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 555, 558-59 (1985), with Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983), and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908.
57

Stephens v. Rohde, 478 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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constitutionally abhorrent behavior."58 In any lucid discussion of
punitive damages, the basic goals of punishment and deterrence are
presumed.
Early in the tort reform debate, Jane Mallor and Barry Roberts
surveyed punitive damages and concluded that "[i]nflicting
punishment for past acts . .. tends also to control future behavior
.... [O]thers in a similar position will wish to avoid the unpleasant
consequences of such acts in the future. Punishment, therefore,
cannot be separated from deterrence." 59 Stated another way,
punitive damages raise the cost of misconduct. 60 A rational actor
avoids costs that do not contribute to profitability or efficiency. In
that sense, the potential for imposition of punitive damages plays
6
an extraordinarily powerful prospective role. I
While there are those who assert that the paucity of empirical
data on the impact of punitive damages suggests an absence of
deterrence,6 2 there is no lack of clarity on the part of the United
States Supreme Court regarding the deterrent role of punitive
'63
They "are imposed for purposes of... deterrence.
damages.
They are properly imposed to serve "legitimate interests in
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition."64 The
65
goal is to "serve a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence."
Though there have been several Supreme Court cases raising

58 Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming an award
of $170,000 in punitive damages against former Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates); see
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006). In a challenge to an allegedly wrongful
search, the Court counseled reliance on tort liability, noting, inter alia, "civil liability is an
effective deterrent." Id.; see also Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 343 (Ohio
1994) ("The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff, but to punish and
deter certain conduct.").
59 Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 639, 648 (1980).
60 See Leslie E. John, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in the
Borderlandof Contract and Tort, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 2033, 2053 (1986) (arguing that punitive
damage awards have a deterrent effect on others).
61 See Jean C. Love, Presumed General Compensatory Damages in Constitutional Tort
Litigation:A Corrective Justice Perspective, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 67, 68-69 (1992) (arguing
that punitive damage awards are successful deterrents).
62 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, A Comment on Causation, Law Reform, and Guerilla
Warfare, 73 GEO. L.J. 1393, 1394 (1985) ("[Ilt is extremely difficult to find any empirical
evidence that the tort system produces deterrence").
63 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (citations omitted).
64 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (citations omitted).
65 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (stating that
punitive damages may be imposed as a deterrent). See also Philip Morris USA v. Williams,
549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007) ("This Court has long made clear that '[p]unitive damages may
properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct
and deterring its repetition."') (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 568)).
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punitive damage issues in recent years, the deterrent effect has not
66
been questioned.
One of the few empirical works done on punitive damages,
referenced by Professor Michael Rustad, involves a study
undertaken by A.T. Kearney Associates, a consulting firm that
attempted to assess the impact of punitive damage awards on
business behavior. 67 The study finds that of the more than five
hundred companies assessed, all respond at some level to punitive
68
damages, with just under half responding fairly aggressively.
The threat of a large sanction has a powerful influence on
behavior.6 9 In fact, there is a concern that the insufficiency of
damages in some cases will have an under-deterrent effect.7 0 In a
recent article touching in part on punitive damages, the authors
note that "potential defendants surely do not ignore the possibility
of large damage awards and may accordingly change their behavior
as a result of such awards. Thus, tort damage awards can exert a
regulatory effect, (i.e., deterrence or promotion of certain behaviors)
similar to statutory and regulatory law."7 1 While there may be
controversy in the field regarding punitive damages, 72 it seems safe
to say that their deterrent effect cannot be seriously questioned.
IV. DETERRENCE DENIERS: THE OPPOSING POINT OF VIEW

While the term deniers may seem somewhat harsh, it is applied to
73
those who reject beliefs or theories accepted commonly as true.
66 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); PhilipMorris USA, 549 U.S.
at 346; Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
67 Michael L. Rustad, How the Common Good is Served by the Remedy of Punitive
Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV. 793, 795 (1997).
68

See id.

69 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: Some Evidence

of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1557 (1999) (an expansive liability rule,
e.g., enterprise liability, has a strong and positive effect on those engaged in or contemplating
dangerous or injurious behavior).
70 See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in
Torts, 70 Mo. L. REV. 691, 695, 703 (2005).
71 Christina E. Wells et al., Preemption of Tort Lawsuits: The Regulatory Paradigmin the
Roberts Court, 40 STETSON L. REV. 793, 803 (2011) (footnote omitted).
72 See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1297 (2005); see, e.g., generally Neil Vidmar & Matthew W. Wolfe, Punitive Damages, 5
ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 179 (2009) (discussing the controversial nature of punitive
damages); Rachel D. Trickett, Comment, Punitive Damages: The Controversy Continues, 89
OR. L. REV. 1475 (2011).
73 Deniers Definition, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/deniers
(last visited Jan. 5, 2012). This term has been used for those who deny evolution, the
Holocaust, climate change, science, or the moon landing. In the context of this article, it
refers to those who deny that tort judgments have a deterrent effect on others.
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About twenty-five years ago, scholarship began to appear
suggesting that the tort system was problematic. 74 The system, it
was argued, did not achieve the goal of deterrence, but rather
served solely to compensate injured individuals.7 5 These proposals
77
urged comprehensive reform7 6 or even abolition of the tort system.
Individuals and businesses, or so went the argument, are simply not
deterred by the prospect of civil liability and tort.78
These
arguments were supported by highly regarded scholars who took
the position that the psychological avoidance response associated
79
with punishment was not evident in the civil justice system.
Part of this attack was based on the fact that "it is extremely
difficult to find any empirical evidence that the tort system
produces deterrence."80
Naturally, the scholarship does not
acknowledge that it is extremely difficult to find any evidence
whatsoever that the tort system fails to deter.
More recent scholarship that adopts the deniers' point of view
suggests that "awareness of legal liability does not always deter
undesirable behavior. In some situations, it does not make any
difference in a reasonable actor's decision making process, and in
other cases, it may successfully deter overly risky conduct."8 1 Other
commentators have argued that deterrence fails because "sanctions
are perceived as weak, [and norms do] not clearly articulate what
8 s2
conduct will be punished.
Some commentators note that tort damages generally and
punitive damages specifically have a limited effect on corporations
and publicly traded companies because the damage award fails to
affect the individual decision-makers but instead punishes
74 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

70-72, 224-27 (1988); Priest, supra note 55, at 1, 5; Sugarman, supra note 55, at 555, 558.
75 See, e.g., Paul Zador & Adrian Lund, Re-Analyses of the Effects of No-Fault Auto
Insurance on Fatal Crashes, 53 J.RISK & INS. 226, 234-41 (1986).
76 See Priest, supra note 55, at 5.
71 See Sugarman, supra note 55, at 558.
78 See Rodgers, Jr., supra note 55, at 16-23; David Schkade et al., DeliberatingAbout
Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1142-43 (2000) (challenging the impact
of uncertainty); W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporationsin
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 288-99 (1998).
79 See, e.g., Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L.
REV. 115, 117-18 (1993); Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Liability and Insurance on
Heavy Drinking and Drinkingand Driving,38 J.L. & ECON. 49, 72 (1995).
80 Mashaw, supra note 62, at 1394.
8' Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A Cultural
Psychological Critique of Tort Law's Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 195, 221 (2004).
82 Sharona Hoffman & Jessica Wilen Berg, The Suitability of IRB Liability, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 365, 408 (2005).
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shareholders.8 3 Another criticism is a more straightforward attack
on the civil justice system itself: "It is hard to conjure up a system of
accident cost control more irrational and less reflective of social
values than the present tort system."8 4 A similar critique includes
the charge that whatever benefits the tort system provides, they are
85
greatly outweighed by the costs the system imposes.
Finally, questions are raised regarding the overall credibility of
the tort system. Given the nature of the tort reform attack over the
last quarter century, this criticism is not surprising. Moreover,
defendants do not always accept the ultimate finding of a court, not
just in terms of liability and damage, but in terms of their own
behavior. Professor Donald C. Langevoort noted this phenomenon:
"[L]egal standards that ask persons to act reasonably have weak
deterrence power when the actor is convinced that he is acting
reasonably."8 6
For purposes of this article, however, while
deterrence of future misconduct by an entity already found civilly
liable is essential, this discussion is focused on the consequence of
that finding on others who "observe" the finding.
V. DENIERS CRITIQUED
Scanning through the section above, it would seem the deniers
believe there is insufficient empirical evidence to prove the power of
deterrence and that the tort system does not achieve the goals it
sets out: punishment and deterrence.
It is hard to argue with the proposition that there is a lack of
credible empirical evidence, in either direction, on the matter of
deterrence. There is powerful empirical evidence, however, on the
impact of punitive damages and the positive effect of uncertainty in
those damages.8 7
Moreover, while this field abounds with
assumptions, when the deniers attack the unpredictability factor of
83 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 870 (1998) (arguing that punitive damages might not affect corporate
behavior since they tend to punish shareholders, not individuals, within the defendant
corporation); John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1820, 1835 (1987).
84 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government
Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1317 (1980).
85 See Sugarman, supra note 55, at 616-17.
86 Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance
with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 71, 117 (2002).
87 Baker et al., supra note 10, at 459. Baker and others assessed separately the risk of
detection and the quantum of damages and concluded, inter alia, that the risk of tort liability
is a powerful deterrent and that reducing uncertainty of punitive damages can undercut their
strong deterrent value. Id.
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the civil justice system targeting punitive damages, they "assume
without questioning that uncertainty in sanctions is undesirable."8 8
In fact, the data on deterrent response to punitive damages is
exactly the opposite. 9 It is counterintuitive to claim that the
potential for liability or the imposition of liability on one party has
little or no effect on similarly situated entities. The challenge is to
identify the change or shift in behavior by those other parties.
Consider a hypothetical finding of liability against a
manufacturer in an automobile design defect case. When that
happens, at least two things seem instantly true: First, all rational
similarly situated entities (nonparty producers of automobiles) will
make certain their products do not create or present the same or
similar design feature. If so, unless one is inclined to waste assets,
those problems will be corrected. Second, any nonparty company
making those corrections will not run a product campaign based on
the following advertising text: "Our vehicles were quite flawed and
dangerous. We just learned about it. Sorry about that. Fear notat least not for our new models-we have resolved the problem!"
Instead, the vast majority of rational actors will respond by
minimizing risk (to the benefit of the public), while not calling
attention to their shortcomings. That is deterrence. It may also
explain why proving post-judgment amelioration is not readily
subject to empirical study.
Given the lack of empirical data, a survey was conducted for this
article seeking attitudes and beliefs regarding deterrence. 90 The
survey was sent to the in-house legal representatives in the general
counsel's office (or similarly titled office) at many of the largest
businesses in the United States. 91 Respondents were asked to
indicate their agreement or disagreement with five options
pertaining to deterrence. 92 Respondents were promised complete
88 Id. at 452 (citations omitted).
89 See id. at 446-47.

90 See letter from Andrew F. Popper, Professor of Law, Am. Univ., Wash. Coll. of Law, to
Fortune 500 companies (on file with author) (forwarding letter and survey questionnaire to
Fortune 500 companies and containing respondents' answers).
91 See id. The recipients were picked from the most recent Fortune 500 List. Our Annual
available at
Corporations, CNN
MONEY,
of America's
Largest
Ranking
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune5O0/2011/full-list/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
92 The survey questions and summary percentile responses follow:
The operating premise of each option below is the same: you have learned a tort
judgment has been entered against a competitor company or other similarly situated
entity. In the case, a court found the company's product was defectively designed.
Upon hearing the news of the judgment:
1) Our company is likely to examine methods of production regarding the affected
product [or service] and, if needed, quietly take steps to make sure our products are in
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anonymity. 93

Although the response rate was modest (15%), while most agreed
that one should not generalize about deterrence because
"[i]ndividual judgments affect us in different ways," 73% agreed
that a tort judgment against a company in the same line of
commerce would prompt their company "to examine methods of
production regarding the affected product [or service] and, if
needed, quietly take steps to make sure our products are in
compliance with applicable standards." 94 That is the deterrent
effect the tort system promises.
Another argument raised regarding deterrence involves the
concession that while there is a real deterrent effect generated by
the tort system, it produces antisocial avoidance behaviors that
undercut rather than enhance public safety, innovation, and
efficiency. 95 This argument denies the efficacy of tort law and civil
justice entirely. 96 If this is true, then all enforcement of any right or
entitlement-in any field-would suffer the same fate. This is at

compliance with applicable standards. (Tort actions deter misconduct) [73% agreed or
strongly agreed.]
2) The recent history of tort litigation has so many problematic and unfair judgments
that we simply do not use tort cases involving other companies as a guideline. We have
confidence in our products and are not affected by the misfortunes of our competitors.
(Tort actions do not deter misconduct) [27 % agreed or strongly agreed, 73% disagreed.]
3) To react in any way to such a civil tort judgment would be an affirmation of a tort
system that we believe to be problematic. (We are a pro tort reform company) [47%
agreed or strongly agreed.]
4) To fail to react to a civil tort judgment could be seen as an admission that we do not
care about the well-being of our customers. (We are responsive to consumer needs) [60%
agreed.]
5) One cannot and should not generalize about such matters. Tort judgments are, by
definition, case-specific. Individual judgments affect us in different ways. (It is unsafe
to generalize about the value of the tort system). [93% agreed or strongly agreed.]
See letter from Andrew F. Popper to Fortune 500 companies, supra note 90.
93 See id.
94 These quotations are taken from the anonymous responses to the survey.
91 See Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency
Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 649 (2007) ("Possible liability-avoidance measures ... include: (1)
limiting . . . clinical studies ... ; (2) declining to engage in an independent evaluation of
adverse incident[s] . . . ; (3) never initiating a postmarketing . . . study unless absolutely

necessary. [Consequently], opportunities to uncover serious safety and efficacy issues could
be lost, and the health care environment could become significantly riskier." (citations
omitted)).
96 See id. at 648-49; see also David Dana, When Less Liability May Mean More Precaution:
The Case of Nanotechnology, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 153, 158-59 n.8 (2010) (stating
"liability avoidance may contribute to an absence of testing or monitoring") (citing Wendy E.
Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773,
820-21 (1997) ("[T]he manufacturing community appears to believe that safety research ...
invites, rather than wards off, litigation.")).
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odds with the most fundamental precepts of the legal system. 97
The argument that the discernible consequence of a tort judgment

is inefficient and antisocial behavior requires assumptions of poor
management, waste, and bad faith. The deniers sell short the civil
justice system, the law of torts, and the power of the marketplace.
They undervalue the obvious. Sanctions change behavior. To
believe otherwise is to deny the common human experience. Tort98
decisions have been a font of important and powerful norms.
Individuals and businesses are guided by tort decisions. 99
Obviously, it is not the sole force motivating personal, business, or
professional decisions, but to deny that it is a critical force rings
hollow. Frankly, were the tort system not so powerful, why spend
such huge sums on tort reform?100 Accountability can be painful.101
However, defendant's pain aside,1 the imposition of liability changes
positively the behavior of others. 02

Civil justice and tort law are about more than compensation.
"Tort law is both premised on and sends messages about the worth
of individuals ....

It specifically demarcates which interests are

valuable." 10 3
normative." 10 4

It is a system of law that "is quintessentially
The system is designed to be "reconstructive," a task
10 5
not achieved by singular verdicts.
Beyond protection of the interests of individuals through
judgments, the tort system has served as a force to guide the actions
Individuals, private entities, and public
of government.106
institutions all respond to sanctions. 10 7 Were they to do otherwise,
their acts would be, by definition, irrational. 108
In addition to exerting a positive effect on individuals and

97 Dana, supra note 96, at 157-58.

98 See
99 See
HOFSTRA
100 Id.

Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 178-79 (1992).
F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the 'Tort Reform" Movement, 35
L. REV. 437, 445-47 (2006).
at 439 (detailing some of the expenditures on different tort reform initiatives).
at 440-41, 444.

101

Id.

102

105

Levit,
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

106

See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS

103
104

supra note 98, at 178-79.
174.
178.
179.

182-83 (1983); Charles R. Epp, Exploring the Costs of Administrative Legalization: City
Expenditures on Legal Services, 1960-1995, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 407, 413 (2000); Daryl J.
Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 345 (2000); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L.
REV. 1555, 1664-69 (2003).
107 See FERSTER & SKINNER, supra note 25, at 7-11.
108

Id.
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governments, the tort model supports regulatory actions, and at
times, achieves goals that cannot be achieved through regulatory
enforcement. 10 9 A finding of liability in a case involving corporate
misconduct can have spiraling positive effects. The liability of one
company "can lead companies to institute 'preventative measures'
that deter by making misconduct more difficult or expensive for
wrongdoers."11 0 Civil tort judgments have the effect of "inducing
organizations to develop claims management capabilities" and
thereby "improve safety, reduce risk, and increase compliance with
external legal requirements."' 1 1 Whether that behavior changes as
a consequence of social or moral obligation or because of the desire
to avoid liability, the result is the same: deterrence.1' 2
The common law of torts houses hundreds of thousands of cases
decided over centuries. Some cases are known broadly and have
deep and lasting consequences.1 3 In addition, industry behavior
and market response (in terms of investment value) are affected by
cases that have unusual or unexpected outcomes.1' 4
Some
situations that provide a basis for civil liability do not result in
common law decisions-but public knowledge of the conduct and
practices can be enough to change a market. 115 In such cases-for
example, Johnson & Johnson's Tylenol saga' 1 6 -the possibility of
liability coupled with regulatory enforcement produces the

109See FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION: BEYOND "PUNISH OR PERSUADE" 37 (1997).
110 Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, ControllingCorporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
CorporateLiability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 693 (1997).
11l Margo Schlanger, OperationalizingDeterrence: Claims Management (In Hospitals, a
Large Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), 2 J. TORT L. 1 (2008).
112 See Catherine A. Sanderson & John M. Darley, "I Am Moral, But You Are Deterred"
Differential Attribution About Why People Obey the Law, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 375,
375-80 (2002).
113Ann Taylor, Public Health Funds: The Next Step in the Evolution of Tort Law, 21 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 753, 755-63 (1994) (discussing toxic torts and the impact of the civil
justice system).
114See Suresh Govindaraj et al., Using the Event Study Methodology to Measure the Social
Costs of Litigation-A Re-Examination Using Cases from the Automobile Industry, 3 REV. L.
& ECON. 341, 344 (2007).
110 See, e.g., Isabel Wilkerson, Tylenol Maker Settles in Tampering Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/14/usltylenol-maker-settles-in-tamperingdeaths.html.
116 Johnson & Johnson marketed the over-the-counter pain medication Extra Strength
Tylenol. The product was sold in capsules. In fall of 1982, seven people were poisoned when
taking the capsules, unaware that a person with criminal intention had opened the capsules
and refilled them with cyanide. See McNeilab, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 645 F Supp. 525,
527 (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd, 831 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The nation was stunned when, between
September 29 and October 1, 1982, seven persons in the Chicago area died after ingesting
Extra Strength Tylenol capsules laced with cyanide.").
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deterrent effect that is the promise of the tort system. 117 The
potential for tort liability pushes parties into safer modes of design
and manufacturing. 118
The fact is that tort law generates "directive norms" that
"regulate conduct ranging from how a physician treats her patients
and how a driver treats other drivers, to how a large industry
monitors its emissions and how a manufacturer designs its
appliances. In this important sense, tort law is also a form of public
law."ll 9
While different schools of jurisprudence seek to characterize the
tort field (normative, corrective justice, instrumentalist, and more),
jurisprudential classification that explains this part of the civil
justice system differs from the more basic mission of deciding
whether the tort system has value beyond compensation. Simply
put, "tort law is better justified as a means of deterring behavior
that society deems risky and undesirable."' 120 One can believe in the
mission of corrective justice (finding wrongdoers accountable and
making whole victims) and also recognize the inevitable deterrent
21
consequence of a civil liability judgment.
VI. FORESIGHT IN PERSPECTIVE

A deterrent effect occurs when market actors have the capacity to
anticipate the potential of liability. This does not require a civil tort
judgment. Parties are deterred from misconduct because they
anticipate that undertaking an action or producing a product in a
particular way could produce a basis for a finding of liability, in the
event the action caused harm. This raises the question of the extent
to which harm must be reasonably foreseeable.
It is safe to estimate that at least one million law students have
pondered foreseeability after reading Chief Judge Cardozo's famous
117 See generally Tamper-Resistant Packaging Requirements for Certain Over-the-Counter
Human Drug and Cosmetic Products, 21 C.F.R. §§ 211, 314, 700 (1982); Thomas D. Dowdell
et al., The Tylenol Incident, EnsuingRegulation, and Stock Prices, 27 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 283, 283-84, 292 (1992) (detailing how the Tylenol crisis caused Johnson &
Johnson stock prices to tumble).
11 See Steven Garber & Anthony G. Bower, Newspaper Coverage of Automotive Product
Liability Verdicts, 33 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 93, 94-95 (1999).
119 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 92-93 (1998).
120 Beatrice A. Beltran, Posner and Tort Law as Insurance, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 162
(2000).
121 Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997) (viewing corrective justice, deterrents,
and normative articulation as relatively compatible).
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opinion in the Palsgrafcase: "The risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed ....*"122 The principle articulated in
Palsgrafis usually delivered in a first-year torts class after students
contemplate the possibility of imposing liability without foreseeable
risk 123 and the possibility of denying liability when a risk is not
reasonably perceived but is somewhat proximate.124
Those pondering deterrence should not be seduced by the allure of
the foreseeability/proximate cause dialogue. Unlike the single-case
focus of the foreseeability discourse, the deterrence debate is not
about single party liability or compensation entitlements in one
case. 125 It is about the effect of the civil justice system generally.
Market participants are deterred from potential misconduct because
of cases that are on point, cases that articulate clear norms, cases
that articulate fuzzy norms that, if transgressed, could get one in
trouble. It is also about actions, behaviors, or products never
mentioned or touched in a civil tort case where a rational actor
changes behavior because of perceived risks to users and
consumers. In each instance, an individual or entity anticipates or
foresees some level of hazard and that anticipation becomes the
126
force to change behavior. That qualifies torts as public law
without implicating the haunting duty of care and foreseeability
questions raised by Justice Cardozo in 1928.127
Courts and commentators readily identify the potential of tort
recovery as a means of curing behaviors in a particular field or
practice. 28 In Merten v. Nathan,the plaintiff signed an exculpatory
Court of Wisconsin found
contract that the Supreme
Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
See In re Polemis, [1921] 3 A.C. 560 (K.B.); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller
Steamship Co. [The Wagon Mound II], [19671 1 P.C. 617 (H.L.).
124 See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. [The Wagon Mound],
[1961] 1 H.L. 388 (P.C.).
125 Foresight is about the capacity to anticipate risk and, hopefully, take steps to guard
against the realization of that risk in order to avoid injury and, of course, litigation. The
doctrine is compatible with and predicated on the notion of deterrence: the obligation to
anticipate injury and the duty to guard against it is driven, in part, by the specter of tort
liability.
116 See Zipursky, supra note 119, at 92-93.
217See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100-01; see also John C.P. Goldberg, Community and the
Common Law Judge: Reconstructing Cardozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324,
1334-36 (1990).
128 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Limits on the Privity and Assignment of Legal Malpractice
Claims, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1561 (1992) (discussing the assignment of malpractice cases
in part on the premise that malpractice litigation can deter others from similar misconduct);
Jessica Michelle Westbrook, Commentary, Resolving the Dispute Over When Attorney's Fees
Should Be Awarded Under ERISA in Two Words: PlaintiffPrevails, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1311,
1319 (2002).
122

123
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unenforceable. 129 In imposing a regime of civil tort liability, rather
than letting the matter be resolved by contract, they held that "[t]he
law of torts is directed toward compensation" and that "[t]ort law
also serves the 'prophylactic' purpose of preventing future harm;
payment of damages provides a strong incentive to prevent the
occurrence of harm.' 3 °
The question of whether a suit may or may not be filed, like
uncertainty in the quantum of damages, will not lessen
deterrence-it may actually sharpen the deterrent effect.13 1 The
possibility of liability without precise parameters affects positively
the behavior of other actors. "[The] threat of litigation and
judgment.

..

creates a constant pressure on... parties to create a

This behavioral force is
mutually satisfying relationship ..
Market participants must "consider both the
comprehensive.
reasonableness of the activity to be undertaken and the
reasonableness of the manner in which he engages in the conduct in
question." 133 These prophylactic considerations are affirmative
signs that rational actors are responsive to the civil justice system.
This is the positive and undeniable phenomenon of deterrence.
".."132

VII. CONCLUSION

The goals of sanctioning wrongdoers, compensating victims,
corrective justice generally, and punishment may seem dominated
by financial considerations. Although the goal of "making a plaintiff
whole" is essential and laudable, the simple fact is that money is not
the only goal. Money approximates loss and covers expenses. It can
alter financial possibilities and provide remedial potential. Justice
requires more: the avoidance of similar harms, or deterrence.
In our common law legal system, new regulatory standards,
complex rules, and agency guidelines are not generated every time a

129 Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Wis. 1982); Bansemer v. Smith Labs., Inc., No.
86-C-1313, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16208, at *8-9 (E.D. Wis. 1988) ("State tort law, on the
other hand, compensates aggrieved persons even as it prevents future harm.") (citations
omitted).
130 Merten, 321 N.W.2d at 177.
131Baker et al., supra note 10, at 487 ("Perhaps the most reasonable conclusion to draw,
however, is that in contexts that do not raise serious concerns of injustice and unfairness,
uncertainty could indeed be manipulated in order to increase deterrence without
compromising the ideals underlying legal institutions.").
132 Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neocontract, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 1177, 1220 (1990) (citation omitted).
133 Joseph A. Page, Liability for Unreasonably and Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Does
Negligence Doctrine Have a Role to Play?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 96 (1996).
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harm is inflicted. 34 In many instances, it is the civil justice system
that provides present and prospective normative force. Through the
legal process, claims are filed, settlements reached, litigation is
initiated, and the potential for compensation is addressed. Through
precisely that process, the engine of deterrence is activated.
The written history of the human experience is replete with
models of normative articulation, principles set forth with the goal
of deterrence. Every major religion records its standards in some
form of text. 135 The mythology of both literate and preliterate
cultures reflects the hope that certain basic norms will guide future
behavior.
The common law is far from a religious text but it articulates
norms, refining them continuously, with the hope of improving the
human condition. That such an elaborate, complex, phenomenally
central system of justice would exist solely to provide individual
compensation is inconceivable.

134 See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV.
749, 801-02 (2008) ("Regulation should only be considered where such specific evidence
proves the existence, in the specific market, of a behavioral market failure that generates
significant welfare costs."); Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products
Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1130 (2007) (discussing the delicate balance
between state tort law and federal regulations); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption:An InstitutionalApproach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 452 (2008) (discussing the
role of Congress and the courts as the balance between tort law and regulation is played out
in increasingly complex preemption cases).
135 John Witte, Jr., Natural Rights, PopularSovereignty, and Covenant Politics: Johannes
Althusius and the Dutch Revolt and Republic, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 565, 582 (2009) ("[Alt
a certain level of abstraction, the moral laws of the Bible and common laws of the nations
converge, even though they have very different origins, ends, and languages.").

